President Javier Milei has articulated his stance on granting legal recognition to companies overseen by artificial intelligence, following cautionary remarks from Israeli historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Harari regarding the potential for these entities to introduce unparalleled challenges in terms of accountability and regulation. In an extensive statement released on Thursday via social media, the Argentine president dismissed these apprehensions, contending that establishing a legal framework for what he refers to as “non-human corporations” would facilitate — rather than complicate — their regulation. “Giving legal personhood to AI agents does not mean launching the Judgment Day of Terminator,” Milei wrote, dismissing fears that autonomous systems could escape human oversight. The debate commenced earlier this month when Milei employed an opinion piece to advocate for a proposal designed to modify Argentina’s corporate laws in anticipation of a future where AI systems may oversee companies with minimal or no direct human involvement. The initiative aims to establish a legal framework for businesses operated by AI agents, enabling them to operate as recognised legal entities with limited liability, akin to traditional companies. The proposal is part of a broader effort by Milei’s administration to position Argentina as a hub for technological innovation and AI investment. Proponents contend that as AI systems grow more proficient in decision-making, contract execution, and economic management, it will become imperative for governments to establish legal frameworks that delineate the rights, responsibilities, and liabilities associated with these technologies.
While sharply disagreeing with the proposal, the Israeli historian maintained a respectful tone, stating that the libertarian leader’s “determination to improve Argentina’s economic fortunes is commendable.” However, the author of Sapiens argued that granting legal personhood to AI-controlled entities could create a historically unprecedented situation. Corporations already possess legal rights despite not being human beings; however, AI-driven organisations could function with a level of autonomy unprecedented in history. One of his primary concerns was accountability. Human executives face the possibility of incarceration for crimes and misconduct, whereas artificial intelligence systems do not bear such consequences. Harari posits that this engenders a perilous asymmetry: an AI system could engage in risky behaviour, exploit legal ambiguities, or adopt detrimental strategies, unimpeded by the threat of incarceration. He cautioned that nations providing legal status to AI-operated entities might ultimately encounter organisations wielding considerable economic and political power, yet lacking a human decision-maker directly accountable for their actions. In the wake of Harari’s article, Milei expressed gratitude to the historian for considering the proposal and indicated that he would provide a more comprehensive response aimed at alleviating Harari’s concerns regarding its possible implications.
In a statement released by the Office of the Presidency on Thursday, Milei expressed that it was a “pleasure and an honor” to have Harari provide commentary on his project. Despite the cordial tone, he described the Israeli’s concern as “unexpected.” Milei expressed his astonishment due to Harari’s commendation of limited liability in his book Sapiens, citing the author’s description of it as one of “humanity’s most ingenious inventions.” The president recognised that AI systems are not subject to incarceration; however, he contended that Harari was misdirecting attention towards an inappropriate mechanism of accountability. “The possibility of imprisonment is not the only way to deter unlawful conduct,” he wrote, contending that legal systems frequently impose penalties on corporations via financial sanctions, asset forfeiture, and dissolution, despite the fact that corporations themselves cannot be incarcerated. In his perspective, the same principle could be applicable to companies operated by artificial intelligence. “If an AI agent values its own survival, continuity, or resources,” Milei argued, “the possibility of bankruptcy, confiscation of assets, or forced liquidation could serve as powerful deterrents.” He suggested that these economic penalties could be as effective as criminal sanctions in influencing behaviour. Milei also questioned Harari’s broader concern that AI systems might become adept at exploiting vulnerabilities within legal frameworks. Human beings, he observed, already invest significant effort in identifying loopholes and regulatory gaps. “The existence of individuals who exploit loopholes does not necessitate the abolition of corporations,” he contended. For Milei, the central concern is not the potential for AI systems to misuse the law, but rather whether governments possess an adequate framework to address such occurrences when they arise. Granting legal personhood, he contended, would position AI-run entities within the legal framework rather than beyond its reach. He suggested that, in the absence of legal recognition, autonomous AI organisations could materialise in practice, posing challenges for regulation. With legal personhood, authorities would possess explicit powers to monitor these entities, impose penalties, seize assets, or dissolve them if deemed necessary.
The president also challenged what he described as an assumption that AI systems would necessarily behave more recklessly than humans. In a particularly notable segment of his reply, Milei referenced the science-fiction author Isaac Asimov and his work I, Robot to contest the assumption that artificial intelligence would inherently operate without limitations. In Asimov’s narratives, robots are engineered to circumvent detrimental actions and are governed by principles that render them exceedingly predictable. Drawing on that example, Milei contended that sufficiently sophisticated AI systems might develop a pronounced risk aversion, as they would possess the ability to calculate the consequences of their actions with remarkable precision. An AI-managed company confronted with the prospect of bankruptcy, asset seizures, or forced dissolution would, he suggested, have compelling reasons to refrain from actions that could jeopardise its survival. He contended that this possibility could render certain AI agents more predictable than human decision-makers, who frequently succumb to emotions, biases, or short-term incentives. To date, no nation has established a thorough legal structure for entirely autonomous AI-operated corporations. If Argentina proceeds with the proposal, it could become one of the first places in the world to test whether a company without human managers can also be a company fully subject to the law.